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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
NUGENERA, INC., a
California Corporation,
Plaintiff,
VS.
SALVADOR DOLLY and
DOES I-X,
Defendants.

CASE NO. MHP-01-9999
DEFENDANT DOLLY'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT: MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
THEREOF
Date: Nov. 9, 2001
Time: 2:30 pm
Courtroom: Ramo Auditorium

Defendant, SALVADOR DOLLY, by and through his counsel
of record, respectfully submits this Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment under
Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. An Expert Witness
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Statement of Defendant Dolly's expert, Richard A. Myers, Ph.D., is
filed separately.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Possession of one's own body is an inherent and fundamental
human right that cannot be abrogated simply because legislation has
not kept pace with advances in biotechnology. Yet, this is precisely
what Plaintiff is attempting to successfully assert with its patent
infringement suit against Defendant Salvador Dolly.
Recent developments in biotechnology have created a
wellspring of intellectual property based on the building blocks of
life; Deoxyribo Nucleic Acid (DNA). One's genome is a necessary
and unique element of every human being as it contains the template
of instructions for each individual. Not only does one's DNA
contain vital genetic life instructing information, it also encodes for
the uniquely personal and inherited set of instructions it comprises.
Therefore, an individual's genetic composition, both as a chemical
composition and as the source of personal information for which it
encodes, is as much one's individual property as any other part of
one's body. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
has correctly classified DNA compositions as patentable inventions,
but only if statutory requirements for patentability are met. One
must keep in mind that while DNA compositions are patentable, they
differ uniquely from other patentable compositions in that their value
to the source individual (i.e., as genetically private material) cannot
be separated from their utility to society as a whole.
In keeping up with growing concern over whether genes should
be patentable, if maintaining their patentability outweighs their
potential invasion of privacy, the PTO has promulgated a new set of
utility guidelines that follow court precedent and set a higher and
more clarified standard of utility required for patenting gene
inventions. Unfortunately, Plaintiffs patent has slipped through the
loopholes of the patent process. Plaintiff has, without Dolly's
consent, patented his entire genome. Plaintiffs patent also seeks to
assert proprietary rights over ten specific genes belonging to Dolly,
despite a gross failure to meet basic tests of patentability, utility,
enablement, and anticipation. In this case, Plaintiff attempts to
further extend its ill-gotten monopoly and exclude Dolly's sale of his
own whole blood.
Courts have repeatedly affirmed an individual's right to control
his or her own property. Every individual has proprietary rights and
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original ownership over their own body tissue. This right can only
be relinquished with the original owner's consent. If Plaintiff's
patent claims are valid, public policy prohibits its enforcement. Any
inventive contribution made by Plaintiff was made possible only as a
result of its misappropriation of Dolly's tissue and by subsequent
violation of Dolly's genetic privacy. Sound public policy mandates
invalidation of Plaintiff's U.S. Patent No. F6,635,271 ('271 patent)
patent claims and a return of the intellectual property to its rightful
owner.
Therefore, Defendant Dolly's Motion for Summary
Judgment should be granted.
II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Is a claim to a single individual's entire genome valid in light of
35 U.S.C. § 101?
2. Can a patent for an isolated genetic composition (DNA) provide
the basis for a cause of action prohibiting use of the DNA and the
unique information it contains by the individual who carries that
DNA?
3. Do the traditional principles underlying a patent's purpose and
proprietary rights it provides permit a finding of patent validity and
the enforceability over an individual whose own tissue was the
foundation for the patented invention?
4. Can specific DNA sequences from a single individual
be credibly identified as the genes conferring Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) resistance (or any phenotype)-absent an epidemiological study of a statistically significant
population?
5. Can a patent claim remain valid and enforceable if
misappropriated tissue formed the basis for such a claim?
6. Is it good public policy to find a claim valid or to enforce an
issued claim where the claimed subject matter encompasses an
individual's own DNA and excludes that individual's right to use his
own DNA?
7. Is it good public policy to allow the patenting of an individual's
genetic material if doing so is an invasion of that individual's
fundamental right to privacy?
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III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff NuGenEra, Inc. (NuGenEra) is a commercial business
entity whose principal place of business is Santa Clara, California.
On August 5, 1999, patent application serial No. 9,432,341 was filed
with the PTO by Acosta et al. and assigned to NuGenEra.
Subsequently, the '271 patent was issued on May 28, 2000. The
subject matter of the claimed invention encompasses Defendant
Salvador Dolly's entire genome (Dolly Genome) as well as ten other
specific gene combinations (P or P1-P10) from Dolly's genome.
Plaintiff NuGenEra's Complaint alleges that Defendant Dolly
engaged in the sale and offered to sell his own genome. Further, the
Complaint alleges that this sale and the offer to sell his genome
within the United States is an infringement of Claim 1 and Claim 2
of the '271 patent.
Dolly is a married individual who resides in California. Dolly
and his wife had been trying for several years to conceive. After
several unsuccessful attempts, Mr. and Mrs. Dolly decided to pursue
other advanced treatments for infertility. As part of this endeavor,
they decided to seek genetic testing prior to embarking on in vitro
fertilization in order to rule out any possibility of passing on
genetically based traits to their unborn child. Therefore, on July 31,
1998, Dolly provided three whole-blood samples to Advanced
Genetic Testing Company (AGTC).
According to the agreement, the samples were only to be tested
with currently available diagnostic methods for any known
inheritable disease-associated genes. Mr. and Mrs. Dolly paid for the
cost of sampling and genetic tests performed by AGTC because their
standard health insurance policy did not pay for it. Prior to
withdrawal of his blood samples, Dolly signed AGTC's consent
form, allowing AGTC to carry out the genetic tests on his tissue
samples. (See Pl.'s Compl., App. A.)'
The consent form specifically stipulates that Dolly consented
to the testing of "known genetically-based diseases" such as
1. The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review will not be publishing the

Complaint or Appendix A referenced in Defendant Dolly's Points and
Authorities. Appendix A contains NuGenEra's Consent Form at issue in this
case. To obtain a copy of the Complaint and Appendix A, see The Program
for Law and Technology at CaliforniaInstitute of Technology & Loyola Law
School Web site, at http://techlaw.lls.edu/atc3/pleadings.html.
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"Tay-Sachs Disease, thallassemia, sickle cell disease, Familial
Mediterranean Fever [a]nd Phenylketonuria (PKU)." (Pl.'s Compl.,
App. A.) Dolly was initially concerned about the use and testing of
his tissue and DNA samples. But the following passage in the
consent form assuaged his fears: "I understand that all information
will be confidential and will not be disclosed by Advanced Genetic
Testing staff, except to my personal physician as identified below."
(Pl.'s Compl., App. A.) The consent form further stipulated that the
only information to be provided by AGTC would be "results of my
[Dolly's] genetic testing." (Pl.'s Compl., App. A.) Due to the
extremely specific and limited nature of this consent, Dolly signed
the consent form and proceeded with the genetic tests. At no time
then, nor after, was Dolly informed of, nor did he consent to, any
other use of his tissue samples or additional testing of his tissue
samples.
After Mr. and Mrs. Dolly successfully conceived and gave birth
to their first child, Dolly was approached by various academic
research institutions requesting samples of his tissue because Dolly
was naturally resistant to HIV infection. On November 30, 2000,
Dolly, as part of a limited partnership (Dolly Deal), sold a single
whole-blood sample to Dr. William Morgan of the University of
California. A few weeks later, on December 12, 2000, Dolly sold a
second whole-blood sample to Dr. Paul Hu of California State
University. As a longtime supporter of academic research, Dolly
was hopeful that his contribution to the field of Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) research would mature into a valuable
and useful therapeutic tool for those suffering from HIV.
Additionally, Dolly was hopeful of securing a steady income flow
for his new family. A few weeks later, Dolly and his partnership
offered to sell a whole-blood sample to Dr. Antoinette Avazian, of
Infants' Hospital. Dr. Avazian is well known in the field of pediatric
AIDS research and had suggested to Dolly on several occasions that
he should consider making available his tissue samples for AIDS
research, which Dolly did by donating blood to the Red Cross on
numerous occasions.
Until Dolly was served with NuGenEra's infringement suit,
Dolly was unaware of the existence of the '271 patent. In fact, Dolly
was under the belief that the tissue sample given to AGTC in 1998
had long been incinerated following its use for genetic testing. Dolly
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was never informed that his own genetic material was being used by
NuGenEra for purposes of obtaining exclusive patent rights on their
behalf. Furthermore, Dolly was shocked to learn that the DNA
sequence of his own entire genome had been published and made
publicly available as a result of the patenting and publication of the
'271 patent. Dolly is an individual who considers the privacy of his
body, especially his genetic privacy, to be the most valuable of his
basic rights.
IV. ARGUMENT

A. Claim ] and Claim 2 Are InvalidBecause They Failto Meet
Statutory Standardsfor Patentability
1. Claim 1 and Claim 2 lack utility as required by 35 U.S.C. § 101 of
the Patent Act of 1952
Patent claims that fail to meet statutory utility requirements are
invalid. Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952 provides that
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof," may obtain a patent on the invention or
discovery. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (emphasis added). This means
that inventions lacking usefulness are not patentable. For example,
the identification of a DNA sequence having no known function or
no known target is deemed non-useful for patentable purposes. See,
e.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367,
1384-85 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that where patent specification
failed to disclose a specific target disease for the claimed
compounds, the claimed compounds lacked utility); see also U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, Revised Interim Utility Guidelines
Training Materials, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/guides.htm
[hereinafter TrainingMaterials].
The Supreme Court has defined the statutory term "useful" as
requiring disclosure of at least one "specific" and "currently
available" utility. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).
In other words, the claimed invention must contribute some "realworld value" so that one skilled in the art can use the discovery in a
way that provides "practical utility" to the public. See Nelson v.
Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 855-56 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
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The PTO's new Utility Examination Guidelines (Utility
Guidelines) require that a claimed invention either have a "wellestablished utility" or assert a "specific, substantial, and credible
utility." Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1095
(Jan. 5, 2001). The Utility Guidelines are consistent with established
case law, and are based on both statutory directives and court
precedent. See id. at 1096. A well-established utility is a use that is
"well known," "immediately apparent" or implied by the
specifications' disclosure alone, or taken with the knowledge of one
skilled in the art. See TrainingMaterials, supra, at 7. In order to
maintain its patentability, a patent that fails to assert a wellestablished utility must then assert a "specific, substantial, and
credible" utility. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at
1095. (emphasis added).
Claim 1 is directed at all of the nucleic acid sequences
comprising Dolly's entire chromosomal DNA (i.e., Dolly's entire
genome). Claim 2 is directed at ten gene sequences possibly
involved in conferring HIV resistance. However, as shown below,
Plaintiff's '271 patent fails to assert any utility that would be useful
to either the public at large or to one of ordinary skill in the art. In
fact, based upon a detailed reading of the '271 patent, any alleged
utility that is asserted is "'incredible in the light of the knowledge of
the art, or factually misleading,"' thereby rendering the '271 patent
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In re Isaacs, 347 F.2d 887, 890
(C.C.P.A. 1965) (quoting In re Citron, 325 F.2d 248, 253 (C.C.P.A.
1963).
a. the DNA sequences of Claim I and Claim 2 have no wellestablisheduse
Neither Claim 1 nor Claim 2 has an established, much less a
"well-established," utility. Claim 1 provides the nucleic acid
sequences comprising all of Defendant Dolly's entire genome. There
is no well-established use in owning someone else's entire genome.
(See Expert Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D. at 5.)2 Besides
2. The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review will not be publishing the
Expert Testimony of Richard Myers referenced in Defendant Dolly's Points
and Authorities. To obtain a copy of Richard Myers' Expert Testimony, see
The Programfor Law and Technology at CaliforniaInstitute of Technology &
Loyola Law School Web site, at http:l/techlaw.lls.edu/atc3/pleadings.html.
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conferring in Plaintiff exclusionary rights to Dolly's genome (i.e.,
preventing Dolly from isolating and using his own DNA), the only
other "use" in owning Dolly's entire genome would be to clone
another individual who is genetically identical to Dolly. This also is
not a credible utility. (See Expert Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D. at
5.) Neither of those uses are (nor should be) well-established.
The '271 patent also fails to assert any well-established utility
for Claim 2. Claim 2 of the '271 patent provides: "A combination
of isolated nucleic acid sequences comprising SEQ ID NOs: P1P10," where P1-P10 are a combination of genes which either alone
or in combination "increases"
a cell or animal's resistance to HIV.
3
B.)
App.
(Pl.'s Compl.,
Plaintiffs '271 patent "does not disclose or provide any
evidence that points to an activity" for the claimed DNA sequences,
as required by the Utility Guidelines. Training Materials, supra,
example 9. There is also "no art of record that discloses or provides
any evidence that points to an activity for the target" DNA. Id.
Instead, the '271 patent merely provides DNA sequences derived
from an individual who is naturally resistant to HIV infection. In
order to meet the § 101 requirement, a patent must identify, "unless
it's already well established, a specific, substantial, and credible
utility for" the invention. Gene Patents and Other Genomic
Inventions: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 6 (2000)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Todd Dickinson, Under Secretary
of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office, Department of Commerce).
The '271 patent is silent as to the target sequences and their function.
Throughout the patent's entire three-page specification, there is no
disclosure of where the gene sequences lie, no disclosure of what the
genes are useful for, and certainly no assertion of any real-world use.
In the absence of any disclosed or known use, Claim 2 cannot have
any well-established use. In a best case scenario, the DNA
sequences of Claim 2 could only be used by one skilled in the art for
their further research. Claim 1 and Claim 2 are not patentable
because of their failure to assert any well-established use. In order
3. Appendix B of the Complaint refers to United States Patent Number
F6,635,271, the patent at issue in this case, which is published at 971.
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for Claim 1 and Claim 2 to satisfy the utility requirement, the '271
patent must, therefore, assert a specific, substantial, and credible use.
See id.
b. neither Claim I nor Claim 2 demonstratesspecific, substantial,
and credible utility
Claim 1 and Claim 2 are also invalid because they have no
specific, substantial, and credible utility as required by 35 U.S.C. §
101. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-35; Nelson, 626 F.2d at 856;
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5,
2001). Specifically, the Utility Guidelines set forth three elements
that must be met for patentable utility: 1) the claimed invention must
have a utility specific to the subject matter claimed; 2) the utility
must be substantial; and 3) the utility must be credible. See Utility
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1098. These criteria set the
utility standard for gene patents at "an appropriate level to ensure
incentives for [both] research and the efficient dissemination of
valuable data." Hearing,supra, at 6 (statement of Todd Dickinson).
Claim 1 and Claim 2 not only lack all three criteria, but they also fail
to meet any single one of the above three requisite assertions.
A "specific" utility is one that is particular to the subject matter
claimed. This contrasts with a general utility that would be
See Utility
applicable to the broad class of the invention.
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed., Reg. at 1098. A "substantial"
utility imparts a real-world use (i.e., of immediate, not theoretical
use). See TrainingMaterials,supra, at 7. A "credible utility" is one
that a person of ordinary skill in the art would believe. See Utility
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1098. In other words,
unless one of ordinary skill in the art would have rational basis to
doubt the truth. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §
2107 (8th ed., 2001).
Chemical compositions as compounds are patentable subject
matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 101. Isolated DNA sequences are chemical
compositions, and like other chemicals, have specific molecular
structures that impart specific properties. Even slight variations in
the chemical structure (i.e., sequence) of DNA can result in large
changes in activity.

See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR

BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 473-75 (1983). DNA sequences that have an
established function (i.e., useful as probes for known disease-related
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genes, or share homology with sequences encoding proteins of
known function) are "useful" and, therefore, patentable. See Utility
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1095-97. Some DNA
compositions are useful for patentable purposes because they have a
scientifically established function (e.g., DNA sequence encoding the
HIV co-receptor CCR5 gene). See U.S. Patent No. 6,025,154 (issued
Feb. 15, 2000). However, a DNA sequence having a purely
speculative function can still be useful for patentable purposes if the
sequence shares structural similarity to other DNA sequences
encoding proteins of well-known functions. Claim 1 and Claim 2 of
the '271 patent fall into neither of these categories. Patentable utility
requires an assertion of at least one "specific, substantial, and
credible utility." As shown below, the '271 patent does not assert a
specific, substantial, and credible utility for the claimed DNA
sequences. As such, Claim 1 and Claim 2 are invalid for lack of
utility.
i. element one: there is no specific utility for Claim 1 and Claim 2
A utility is "specific" when it is particular to the subject matter
claimed. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1098.
For example, raw DNA sequence data is not patentable because there
is no specific utility associated with it. See id Claim 1 is raw DNA
sequence data. Therefore, Claim 1 lacks a specific utility.
Claim 2 lacks a patentable specific utility because the claimed
sequences have no known target gene. There is no asserted function,
characterization, or description of the nature of the genes allegedly
conferring HIV resistance. All that is known is that the P sequences
are involved in increased HIV resistance. Plaintiff never isolated,
identified, characterized, or even described the nature of those subcellular factors involved in increasing HIV resistance. Nor are these
actions well-known in the art. Absent a disclosure of what genes or
proteins to which the P sequences are associated, Claim 2 is invalid
for lack of a specific utility.
ii. element two: Claim 1 and Claim 2 have no substantial utility
A substantial utility defines a "real world" or "practical" context
of use. The Supreme Court has pointed out that "[u]nless and until a
process is refined and developed to this point-where specific
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benefit exists in currently available form-there is insufficient
justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to
be a broad field." Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-35 (emphasis added).
An invention's usefidness as a research tool is insufficient to meet
statutory standards of patentability. Therefore, basic research using a
claimed DNA sequence for studying the properties of the DNA itself
is not "a substantial utility." See Hearing,supra, at 6 (statement of
Todd Dickinson)..
Plaintiff has allegedly identified ten genes possibly capable of
conferring HIV resistance. Claim 2 is directed at those. ten
sequences. Because DNA sequences generally encode for proteins,
it is likely that P directs synthesis of protein products. However, the
'271 patent does not disclose any information regarding the nature of
the claimed sequences or protein products. Of course, it is also
possible that the P sequences are enhancer sequences involved in
regulating expression of other genes. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has
neither identified nor suggested possible biological roles of the
protein products. Absent this information, the. claimed P sequence
does not possess any immediate practical utility that is "substantial."
Although the Claim 1 sequences can be used for further research
studies into HIV, it still fails to satisfy the utility requirement. In
order to be patentable, a claimed invention must be useful for more
than further research on itself. See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936
(C.C.P.A. 1967). Even if Plaintiff can assert that the DNA sequences
of Claim 2 are useful for identifying an HIV associated gene, an HIV
preventative gene, or even for human gene therapy, all of these are
highly speculative uses and are therefore not credible. Patents that
assert speculative uses fail to meet statutory utility requirements. See
In re Isaacs, 347 F.2d at 888-90. In order to satisfy the utility
requirement, the patent specification must assert some utility for the
final product of the "claimed intermediate." See In re Joly, 376 F.2d
906 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
Turning now to Claim l's lack of substantial utility, Claim 1
encompasses Dolly's entire genome. A human genome consists of
thirty-thousand to one-hundred-thousand genes.
See John B.
Hogenesch et al., A Comparison of the Celera and Ensembl
Predicted Gene Sets Reveals Little Overlap in Novel Genes, 106
CELL 413, 413-15 (2001). Plaintiff has identified ten genes believed
to confer HIV resistance. This leaves over ninety-nine-thousand (or
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ninety-nine percent) of Dolly's genes as completely uncharacterized,
unpatentable raw sequence data. Therefore, the only real-world
utility provided by Claim 1 is use of the ten P sequences that are
contained- within the claimed genome (i.e., subject matter
encompassed by Claim 2). As is the case for Claim 2, Claim 1 is
also invalid for lack of substantial utility.
iii. element three: Claim 1 has no credible utility
An asserted utility is "credible" unless the facts upon which the
assertion is based are inconsistent with the logic underlying the
assertion. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092
(Jan. 5, 2001). The '271 patent discloses that cells and animals
carrying one or more of the genes of Claim 2 have increased
resistance to HIV. No evidence, however, is provided to exclude the
possibility that the observed HIV resistance is not due to an effect
from some other background DNA sequence present in either Dolly
himself, the test cell, or the test animal. Accepted standards in the
field of genetics require a sufficient sampling of test DNA from
separate sources of individuals all having a common phenotype,
before a determination that a putative DNA sequence is actually
associated with that disease or trait can be made. (See Expert Test.
Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.)
Generally, identification of a disease-related gene requires
epidemiological and linkage studies on hundreds of individuals.
Here, Plaintiff has identified ten separate genes that allegedly confer
HIV resistance. In order to assert a utility for these claimed
sequences that is credible to one skilled in the art, Plaintiff must
show they have the correct ten sequences. At a minimum, Plaintiff
must show that "one or more" P gene combination confers HIV
resistance. Simultaneously, Plaintiff must exclude the possibility
that it is not any one or more of the other one hundred thousand
genes also present in the test cell or animal (i.e., control background
DNA) that is conferring HIV resistance. In order to do this, a
minimum of 1.8 billion separate assays per control background DNA
source must be tested for the ten sequences (where each sequence is
separately, and then in all possible combinations, inserted into a
normal cell or animal with resulting increased HIV resistance). This
type of study is virtually impossible to conduct, physically and
scientifically. The '271 patent discloses gene sequences identified
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from a single individual. This is insufficient to show a believably
acceptable causal link between any specific DNA sequence and
Dolly's HIV resistant trait with respect to other individuals.
Therefore, one skilled in the art fails to find a credible utility for the
Claim 2 alleles. (See Expert Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.)
Because both Claim 1 and Claim 2 are invalid for lack of utility,
Defendant Dolly requests dismissal of this case.
2. Claim 1 and Claim 2 lack enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, because they have no utility
Although the requirement that an invention have specific,
substantial, and credible utility is found in 35 U.S.C. § 101, it is also
implicit in 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph one. See In re Brana,51 F.3d
1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Section 112, paragraph 1 of 35 U.S.C.
reads:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (emphasis added). "[I]f a claimed invention
does not have utility, the specification cannot enable one to use it."
In re Brana, 51 F.3d at 1564. Therefore, lack of enablement and
absence of utility are closely related grounds of unpatentability. See
Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Whether a disclosure is enabling is a legal conclusion based on
underlying factual inquiries and subject to de novo review. See, e.g.,
Bruning v. Hirose, 161 F.3d 681, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Claim 1 and
Claim 2 clearly fail to meet the utility requirement as set forth above.
Claim 1 and Claim 2 are not supported by a well-established, or
specific, substantial, and credible utility. Therefore, one skilled in
the art would not know how to use the claimed invention. A patent
disclosure that fails to teach one skilled in the art "how to make and
use" the claimed invention, is invalid for lack of enablement. See In
re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 942. Thus, Claim 1 and Claim 2 also are invalid
because they fail to comply with the enablement requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 112, paragraph one.

1018

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 35:999

3. Claim 1 and Claim 2 are statutorily barred under 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) based on the prior art
In addition to other grounds of invalidity, Claim 1 and Claim 2
are invalid due to prior art. Defendant Dolly has given blood
samples numerous times since his birth. Indeed, the original source
of tissue from which Plaintiff derived its claimed sequence
information was a tissue sample Defendant Dolly gave to AGTC on
July 28, 1998. This was over one year prior to the filing date of the
'271 patent (August 5, 1999). Title 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) states that a
person shall be entitled to a patent unless "the invention was patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year priorto the
date of the application for patent in the United States." 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) (1994) (emphasis added). Therefore, Claim 1 and Claim 2
are statutorily barred because of Defendant Dolly's own prior use
and by the prior sampling of his tissue by AGTC. Claim 1 and
Claim 2 are also invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Accordingly,
Defendant Dolly requests dismissal of this case.
4. Claim 1 and Claim 2 are invalid for fundamental reasons of public
policy-to grant exclusive rights over an individual's genetic
material to the extent of negating the individual's own use of the
genetic material is an unacceptable negation of the right to bodily
autonomy
a. acceptedpractice in the health and research industry includes
applicationof the highest standardsof informed consent
The patenting of another individual's genome without his
consent is unconscionable. Indeed, it is a violation of all moral and
ethical codes-a type of violation that transcends even current
challenges and concerns regarding the patentability of DNA
inventions and the consequences of granting such patents. Allowing
intellectual property rights over an individual's genome without that
individual's consent is an abandonment of the state's responsibility
to create and maintain for its citizens a proper legal context for life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
This is not the first time in our nation's history that legislation
failed to keep pace with technology. However, given the bullet
speed with which biotechnology has advanced and the technical, as

April2002]

DEF."SMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1019

well as legal, complexity of the subject matter involved, it is
understandable. As stated by California Representative, Howard L.
Berman at the July 2000 House of Representatives Subcommittee
Hearing on Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions, "[t]hese are
very complex issues dealing in arcane areas of science and law"
relating to "the legal and moral issues that are raised by patenting in
new areas of technology." Hearing,supra, at 3 (opening statement
of the Hon. Howard L. Berman, member, House Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property).
This is a case where legislative failure to keep pace with
biotechnology has resulted in severe consequences. The issuance of
the '271 patent has allowed the theft and improper
commercialization of an innocent individual's genetic material-the
embodiment of nature's instructions for making an individual a
living being. Good public policy reflects the fundamental rule that
every citizen has an inherent right to his personal property and
genetic privacy. Although not yet statutorily mandated, most
scientists, clinicians, and health practitioners adhere to this right
through the mechanism of informed consent.
The accepted practice in the health and research industry (both
commercial and academic) is application of the highest standard of
informed consent. This standard of informed consent is applied for
all tests and research that is conducted (or even anticipated to be
conducted) using any part of an individual (both tangible and
intangible). (See Expert Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.); see
Institutional Review Board Guidebook, at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs
Every
.gov/irb/irb chapter3.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
federally funded laboratory conducting studies involving humans
(and animals) must adhere to strict formal guidelines that IRB
administers. Always included in these guidelines, and one of the
clearest and most respected rules within the guidelines, is that of
informed consent. See InstitutionalReview Board Guidebook,supra.
Also reflected in this standard is the underlying policy of the medical
and research community of maintaining a patient's inherent and
fundamental right to decide what to do with his own body.
Although a legal requirement for consent has been applied in
other areas of the law, this is not the case here. There is no current
statute available requiring that consent be given by an individual
prior to the use of his or her tissue for subsequent patenting or
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commercialization. Yet legislative responsiveness does not remove
fundamental issues of right and wrong. Nor does it replace the
ethical and moral imperatives that reflect our society's policy goals,
or reassure our citizens of our court's ability to make the proper
decision in the face of novel and unprecedented demands on our
jurisprudence.
b. the right to bodily autonomy necessarily includes genetic material
An individual's genome is a unique and uniquely defining
element of that individual. It is inviolably one's own property, as
much as a heart, or brain, or blood is one's own property. One's
genetic material is an especially important part of one's body
because the information it encodes is inseparable from its chemical
composition. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In
other words, taking, removing, or isolating a person's DNA
necessarily includes giving access to the information contained in
that DNA compound. It is the extent of information contained in this
chemical composition that endows it with the potential power to
greatly harm the very individual from which it is derived. For this
reason, courts must uphold every individual's right to use, and
control the use of, their own person. Here, the court must find the
claims of '271 patent invalid for fundamental reasons of public
policy.
To hold otherwise would be to reward Plaintiff's
unauthorized use of Defendant Dolly's DNA, as well as to annihilate
Dolly's right to maintain bodily autonomy.
c. allowance and enforcement of intellectualproperty rights against
the individualwhose DNA provided the naturalsource of invention is
unethical
What would happen if the courts allowed the wholesale
appropriation and patenting of one's DNA without his or her
consent? Imagine a world where every handshake, every use of a
restroom, every haircut, and even every physical contact is a possible
opportunity for some inventor to sample your DNA. Even worse,
imagine a world where one's DNA might be stolen to develop
biotechnological products in violation of that individual's deeply
held personal and religious beliefs about the sanctity of human life
and the inviolable role of God (or our parent's DNA) in shaping our
children. Can we stand today and support a world where the
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commercial interests of "genomic" thieves are not merely tolerated,
but rewarded by our state with a legal monopoly to exploit their illgotten gains? We cannot. Even those scientists (arguably the ones
with the most to lose if gene patents are not deemed allowable) do
not condone the use of, or research on, a person's genetic material
without the explicit prior consent of that person. (See Expert Test.
Richard M. Myers, Ph.D. 20.)
The scientific community (as a reflection of good public policy)
concurs that any advance we may find in the realm of biotechnology
cannot come at the sacrifice of an individual's right to bodily
autonomy and control over his or her genetic material. There is no
reason to allow the use, research, or patenting of an individual's
genetic material without informed consent because to prohibit such
activity would not in any way deter or reduce biotechnological
advances. The majority of individuals when approached by scientists
for use of their tissue in research are willing to provide their consent.
(See Expert Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.) Indeed, at last count,
over eighty percent of those individuals contacted had signed consent
forms permitting research use of their genetic material. (See Expert
Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.) Therefore, Plaintiffs '271 patent of
Defendant Dolly's genetic material is invalid, if not for reasons of
statutory lack of utility, then at least for fundamental reasons of
public policy.
d. patentingof an individual'sgenetic materialwithoutprior
express consentfrom that individual is an invasion of one's genetic
privacy
What about other uses of stolen DNA? While this case draws
our attention to the unpatentability of misappropriated genetic
materials, we cannot ignore the larger ramifications of the decision to
be made by this Court. Will this Court support the unregulated theft
of Defendant Dolly's DNA? Can we allow, thereby condone,
Plaintiff s unauthorized patenting of Defendant Dolly's genome and
resulting public access to what should be Defendant Dolly's private
The published '271 patent disseminated
genetic information?
Dolly's personal genetic code for the world to see-his biological
essence. One's right to genetic privacy and its accompanying
protection against genetic discrimination is stated in the proposed
Genetic Privacy Act, which states:
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[A]ny information about an identifiable individual that is
derived from the presence, absence, alteration, or mutation
of a gene or genes, or the presence or absence of a specific
DNA marker or markers, and which has been obtained: (1)
from an analysis of the individual's DNA; or (2) from an
analysis of the DNA of a person to whom the individual is
related.
Patricia (Winnie) Roche et al., The Genetic PrivacyAct. A Proposal
for National Legislation, 37 JuRIMETRucs J. 1, 7 (1996) (describing
the proposal by George Annas, et al.) (quoting The Genetic Privacy
Act of 1995, § 3(m) (Feb. 28, 1995), available at http://
www.oml.gov/hgmis/resource/privacy/privacyl.html.
An obvious
extension of the legislative policy reflected in this Act is to find
invalid those patents that violate one's right to genetic privacy. The
'271 patent is one such patent. For fundamental reasons of public
policy, the '271 patent should be ruled invalid because it violates
Dolly's right to genetic privacy.
B. Defendant Dolly Alone Has the Constitutionaland Common Law
Right to the Use or Sale of His Own Genetic Material
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
"No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. To define
protected property interests, the Supreme Court generally looks to
"existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source," such as federal and state statutes and common law. See Bd
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). As such, the legal
definition of property is most often conceptualized as a bundle of
rights: "rights to possess, to use, to exclude, to profit, and to
dispose." Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir.
1991).
In addition, the constitutional protection of due process "liberty"
creates the right to privacy. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484 (1965).
Some of these privacy rights are deemed
"fundamental" and thus afforded a heightened protection of "strict
scrutiny;" these fundamental privacy rights include, inter alia, the
rights to marry, use contraceptives, choose an abortion, resist
compulsory sterilization, refuse medical treatment, maintain bodily
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integrity, and create and maintain intimate relationships free from
governmental interference. See Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 834, 846 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 269-70, 281 (1990); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759,
767 (1985); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381-83 (1978);
Eisenstadtv. Baird,405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
Here, the Government has violated Dolly's constitutional rights
to both property and privacy by issuing patent protection to
NuGenEra for Dolly's unique genome and gene combination.
Granting NuGenEra the right to exclude others (including Dolly)
from the use and manufacture of Dolly's isolated genome, gene
combination, and an immortalized human cell line thereof, denies
Dolly's liberty to profit from productive use of his body. In addition,
this grant also denies Dolly's liberty to control procreation and
maintain an intimate relationship free from governmental
interference. Accordingly, the government's issuance of the '271
patent is unconstitutional, thus rendering the patent invalid.
1. Dolly has the sole property interest in his blood within his body
The property interest in one's removed blood was upheld in
Green v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1229 (1980). In Green, the
petitioner earned her living by selling her rare type AB-negative
blood. In holding that petitioner's blood plasma was considered
property, the court stated:
The rarity of petitioner's blood made the processing and
packaging of her blood plasma a profitable undertaking,
just as it is profitable for other entrepreneurs to purchase
hen's eggs.., for processing and distribution.... [W]e can
find no reason to legally distinguish the sale of these raw
products of nature from the sale of petitioner's blood
plasma.
Id. at 1234. Here, Dolly sold and offered to sell his whole-blood
samples to two universities and an infant's hospital. Analogous to
Green, the marketability of Dolly's blood samples is predicated upon
his rare genetic properties. Similarly, the sale of hen's eggs is not
distinguishable from the sale of Dolly's blood samples. Therefore,
Dolly's blood samples are deemed his property and thus protected
from takings for public use without just compensation.
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Property rights have also been found to exist in genetic material
having the potentiality of life characteristic. See Hecht v. Superior
Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 846, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281 (Ct.
App. 1993). In Hecht, the petitioner sought to override a writ
directing decedent's (petitioner's boyfriend) estate to destroy all of
the decedent's sperm, which was in direct conflict with decedent's
will. See id. at 844-45, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 279-80. The court stated
that "even if not governed by the general law of personal property,
[the stored sperm] occupies 'an interim category that entitles them to
special respect because of their potential for human life."' Id. at 846,
20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,
597 (Tenn. 1992)). The court then held that, "at the time of his
death, decedent had an interest, in the nature of ownership...
sufficient to constitute 'property."' Id. at 850, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
283.
Analogous to Hecht, Dolly's blood samples have the potential
for human life because they contain his genetic DNA, his entire
genome. Current technology could potentially produce human life
from Dolly's DNA through genetic engineering. Thus, similar to
sperm, Dolly's interest in his blood samples is sufficient to constitute
property and, thus, protected from takings for public use without just
compensation.
Further legal support evincing the labeling of blood samples as
property is derived from the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
("UAGA"). See 8 U.L.A. 19 (1993). UAGA has been enacted in
some form by all fifty states and authorizes the donation of body
parts for transplant or medical research. See id. §§ 2-4, 6(a). UAGA
thus implicitly categorizes body parts as property because the
common usage of a donation is typically envisaged as the giving of
"something." In this manner, Dolly has a property interest in his
blood samples and is thus constitutionally protected to profit from
productive use of those samples.
Opponents might argue that Dolly does not have property rights
in his blood samples in light of Moore v. Regents of the University of
California,51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
However, this argument is erroneous because Moore is
distinguishable both factually and legally. In addition, one might
argue that the holding in Moore is anomalous in light of the current
constitutional rights afforded to one's genetic material.
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The plaintiff in the Moore case, Mr. Moore, was diagnosed with
hairy-cell leukemia that necessitated the removal of his spleen. See
id. at 125-26, 793 P.2d at 480-81, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148. Mr. Moore
consented to this treatment, and for the next seven years continued to
give blood, sperm, and tissue samples with the understanding that
these medical procedures were necessary to his health. See id.
Unbeknownst to Mr. Moore, a doctor had managed to use Mr.
Moore's spleen and other tissue to establish a cell line, which the
doctor subsequently patented. See id. at 127, 793 P.2d at 481-82,
271 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49. Mr. Moore sued the doctor alleging, inter
alia, claims for conversion and property rights in his excised cells
and spleen. See id. at 128 & n.4, 793 P.2d at 482 & n.4, 271 Cal.
Rptr. at 149 & n.4. The court held that Mr. Moore did not have
sufficient property rights in his own cells to sustain a cause of action
for conversion, and once the cells were removed from his body, they
were considered abandoned. See id. at 136, 793 P.2d at 488, 271
Cal. Rptr. at 155.
The Moore court based its holding on the lack of sufficient
arguments as well as on several policy considerations. See id. at
136-48, 793 P.2d at 488-97, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 155-64. The court
noted that the complete lack of precedent in granting property rights
to genetic material was paramount to its decision---"[o]nly property
can be converted." Id. at 138, 793 P.2d at 490, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
Then, the court stated that the fact that a patent had been issued
showed that the tissue in question was not the property of Mr.
Moore; he could not possibly own what the PTO claimed another
owned. See id. at 141-42, 793 P.2d at 492-93, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 15960. Finally, the court addressed several policy considerations: the
rights and interests of Mr. Moore were protected by the informed
consent doctrine and to allow patients property interests in their cells
would threaten to destroy the economic incentive necessary to
conduct important research. See id. at 129-31, 140-42, 793 P.2d at
483-84, 491-93, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51, 158-60. In a sense, the
court applied a Kaldor-Hicks theory of economics and found that the
economic and social benefits of cell research outweighed Mr.
Moore's individual rights. See ProprietaryRights and the Human
Genome Project:A Legal and Economic Perspective, 8 DIG. 45, 52
(2000).
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The Moore case is distinguishable from the instant case in at
least two respects. First, and foremost, Mr. Moore asserted a
common law right to property, whereas here, Dolly is claiming
constitutional rights to property under the Fifth Amendment.
Secondly, Mr. Moore claimed property rights in genetic material that
he had contractually "given" to research. In contrast, Dolly is
claiming property rights in genetic material still in his "possession,"
which he wants to sell/give to research. Accordingly, the holding in
Moore is not applicable to the instant case.
In addition, the court's analysis in Moore is both outdated and
questionable if applied to the current state of the law. First, the court
noted that the complete lack of precedent in granting property rights
to genetic material was paramount to its decision. See Moore, 51
Cal. 3d at 136-37, 793 P.2d at 488-89, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56.
However, currently there is strong support for finding
constitutionally protected rights to property in genetic material such
as blood, sperm, and embryos. See cases cited supra Part IV.B.l.
Second, the Moore court implicitly treated genetic material as
"property" when it held that the genetic material in question was
"abandoned" as well as when the court upheld the rationale of
"informed consent" to transfer ownership of one's genetic materials.
Lastly, the court's policy analysis overlooked many factors not
accounted for, such as the chilling effect on patients consenting to
research without the guarantees of their personal rights.
The government, in conferring NuGenEra with the right to
exclude others' use of claimed features of Dolly's genome, has
directly denied Dolly's right to profit from the productive use of his
blood samples.
Moreover, Dolly has not been given just
compensation for the denial of his property rights. Therefore, the
patent issued to NuGenEra is unconstitutional and thus invalid.
2. Dolly's privacy rights are violated by enforcement of the '271
patent because enforcement would deny Defendant Dolly his
fundamental right to disconnect his body from the public domain
The constitutional right to privacy affords individuals personal
autonomy over their bodies. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. The right
to privacy preserves the right to create and maintain certain intimate
and consensual relationships, free from governmental interference.
Privacy rights also preserve the right to safeguard one's body from
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unwarranted governmental invasions or alterations. In the instant
case, the government has denied Dolly's privacy rights in both of
those characterizations.
a. Dolly has a right to disconnect his bodyfrom invasive
apparatusesthat keep him alive
The right to personal privacy was violated when a state law
refused to allow the withdrawal of artificial food and hydration
procedures from a person in a vegetative state. See Cruzan, 497 U.S.
at 261-63. In Cruzan, the Court faced the question of whether the
Constitution confers a "right to die." Id. at 277. The Court declared:
"The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
may be inferred from our prior decisions." Id. at 278. The Court
went on to hold that "forpurposes of this case, we assume that.., a
competent person [has] a constitutionally protected right to refuse
lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
Although the Cruzan Court stopped short of upholding a "right to
die," subsequent cases interpret its holding to encompass a
fundamental rightto disconnect the body from the invasive apparatus
keeping it alive. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997);
Washington v. Glucksberg,521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Here, Dolly is being "kept alive" by the "immortalized human
cell line comprising his DNA" (Claim 3 of the '271 patent). The
Government, in conferring upon NuGenEra the exclusive use of
claimed features of Dolly's genome, denied Dolly his fundamental
right to refuse this "lifesaving embodiment." Moreover, due to the
disclosure requirements of patentability, Dolly's "life" has forever
been preserved under the microscope of the public domain. Indeed,
there is nothing more "invasive" than this patent (apparatus)
"keeping him alive" for all eternity. Therefore, granting patent rights
to Dolly's genome denies Dolly his fundamental right to disconnect
his body from the invasive apparatus keeping it alive.
b. Dolly has a right to avoid geneticprocreation
A law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
persons was deemed unconstitutional in Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438
(1972). The Court stated: "If the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
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unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). Recently, a law authorizing courts
to order child visitation rights to "any person," despite the parent's
objection, was deemed unconstitutional in Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57 (2000). The Court held that the statute infringed on one's
fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of their
offspring. See id. at 75.
Here, analogous to Eisenstadt and Troxel, Dolly's fundamental
right to make decisions regarding whether to bear, and how to rear
his offspring, is impinged upon by the '271 patent. The patent grants
NuGenEra exclusive rights over claimed features of Dolly's genome.
This provides NuGenEra with the power to create genetic
"offspring" of Dolly through gestation and other genetic engineering
procedures. Moreover, Dolly would have no control over the
development of those offspring. Accordingly, Claim 1 and Claim 2
are invalid because they deny Defendant Dolly his fundamental
privacy right to make decisions whether to bear or beget a child, as
well as decisions on how to rear his offspring.
Opponents might argue that Eisenstadt and Troxel are
distinguishable from the instant case because they deal with
"traditional" notions of procreation and family as opposed to
"procreation in a petri dish." However, this distinction is without
substance in light of cases that uphold one's fundamental privacy
interest in their excised genetic material.
For example, in Hecht, the genetic material at issue was a
deceased man's sperm that was stored in a sperm bank. The court
held that a writ to destroy one's sperm against his wishes was
unconstitutional, concluding that one's privacy rights require a
donor's intent to control the ultimate disposition of his sperm. See
Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 846, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281. Sperm
"occupies 'an interim category that entitles them to special respect
because of their potential for human life .... "' Id. (quoting Davis,
842 S.W.2d at 597).
Here, analogous to Hecht, Dolly's genetic material is harbored
by another. Similar to sperm, his genetic material deserves special
respect because of its potential for human life. This special respect
was denounced when the government issued patent rights in Dolly's
genome to another. Through the concept of patent licensing,
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NuGenEra is allowed to exploit Dolly's "fundamental interest" in
procreation as an item for negotiation and trade. The patent is
unconstitutional because it denies Dolly's privacy right to "control
the ultimate disposition" of one's genetic material that holds the
"potential for human life."
A similar result was reached in Davis, where the court invoked
the right of privacy in a dispute between a divorced couple over the
fate of their frozen embryos. The dispute was over the disposition of
cryogenically preserved embryos remaining from an in vitro
fertilization process. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589. The court held
that "the right of procreation is a vital part of an individual's right to
privacy." Id. at 600. The court then balanced the couple's
conflicting interests and ruled that the husband's right to avoid
genetic parenthood outweighed his former wife's right to procreate
by donating the embryos to others for gestation. See id. at 604.
Analogous to Davis, Dolly's privacy interest over the
disposition of his preserved genetic remains are in dispute. There is
no need to balance the privacy interests of Dolly's genetic material
between the parties because NuGenEra has no privacy rights with
respect to Dolly's DNA. NuGenEra's governmentally protected
ability to create "genetic offspring" directly conflicts with Dolly's
right to avoid genetic parenthood. Thus, the '271 patent is
unconstitutional because it denies Dolly his fundamental right to
avoid procreation.
The government has denied Dolly's fundamental privacy rights
by issuing the '271 patent to NuGenEra. The United States
Constitution "'forbids the government to infinge... 'fundamental'
liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest."' Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). Here, the
issuance of the '271 patent does not serve a compelling
governmental interest, and even if it did, surely there is a less
burdensome alternative. Accordingly, the '271 patent is deemed
unconstitutional and invalid.
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V. CONCLUSION

Claim 1 and Claim 2 of the '271 patent are invalid for failure to
meet statutory standards of patentability, namely, lack of utility, lack
of enablement, and anticipation.
They are also invalid for
fundamental reasons of public policy-to grant exclusive rights to
the use and sale of an individual's entire genome promotes
commercial exploitation and exchange of a person's unique genetic
identity.
This is a particularly troubling negation of that
individual' s-Defendant Dolly' s-right to bodily autonomy.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant Defendant
Dolly's Motion for Summary Judgment. To do otherwise would be
an unconscionable transgression against Defendant Dolly's rights
and the public good.
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